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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
J. RONALD WEST, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20,856 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issue presented by this appeal is whether the District 
Court erred in denying Defendant's Motion to Withdraw his Guilty 
Plea. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant was originally charged by Information with 
having committed the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child, a First 
Degree Felony, alleged to have been committed on January 27, 
1984, in violation of Section 76-5-404.1, Utah Criminal Code. The 
Information was dated January 31, 1984, and was filed in the 
Eighth Circuit Court, Provo Department on the same date. (R. 9). 
On February 9, 1984, at the time set for Preliminary 
Hearing, the Information was amended by interlineation to charge 
Attempted Sexual Abuse of a Child, a Second Degree Felony. On 
that date the Defendant waived his right to Preliminary Hearing 
and was bound over to the Fourth District Court to answer to the 
charge. (R. 2). 
On February 24, 1984, Defendant appeared before Judge George 
E. Ballif and entered a plea of guilty to the Amended 
Information. (R. 13,14). 
Following a presentence investigation by the Department of 
Adult Probation and Parole and two separate 45-day evaluations by 
the Division of Corrections, the Defendant was returned to the 
District Court for sentencing. Defendant was sentenced on July 
20, 1984, on the Second Degree Felony, to an indeterminate term 
in the Utah State Prison of not less than one year nor more than 
fifteen years. (R. 25,26). 
On June 17, 1985, the Defendant signed a Motion to Withdraw 
his Guilty Plea; the Motion apparently was filed in the Court on 
July 2, 1985. (R. 41,42). That Motion set forth two grounds for 
withdrawal of the plea: (1) that the statute was changed to 
provide a sentence materially less than the sentence to which 
Defendant had been subjected; and (2) that the plea was 
improperly induced by threats on the part of the County 
Attorney's Office to seek minimum mandatory sentencing of three, 
six or nine years in the State Prison if a guilty plea was not 
entered on the Amended Information. 
On June 25, 1985, the Utah County Attorney's Office filed a 
Response to Defendant's Motion to Withdraw his plea. (R. 38-40). 
The County Attorney's objection was (1) that the motion to 
withdraw was untimely; (2) that the improper sentencing was being 
considered in a habeas corpus proceeding in the Third District 
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Court; and (3) that the plea was not improperly coerced. The 
County Attorney's Response doesf however, indicate that the law 
was changed seven days before this Defendant's arraignment, and 
well before sentencing. The County Attorney's Office indicated 
that even though sentencing as a Third Degree Felony may be 
appropriate, a withdrawal of plea probably wouldn't help the 
Defendant since he would then be subject to prosecution on the 
Second Degree Felony. 
The County Attorney's Response denies any coercion on their 
part, but does admit that plea negotiations involved discussions 
of minimum mandatory sentencing, which they deemed were even 
available under the law as amended. 
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea was denied on July 2, 
1985. (R. 44). On August 23, 1985, Defendant appeared for 
re-sentencing as a Third Degree Felony; the Commitment was signed 
and filed on September 4, 1985. (R. 50,51). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS 
GUILTY PLEA. 
A. A GUILTY PLEA MAY BE WITHDRAWN IF ENTERED AS A RESULT OF 
FRAUD, DURESS, MISTAKE, OR IGNORANCE. 
B. DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS ENTERED UNDER A MISUNDERSTANDING OF 
THE LAW. 
C. DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS INDUCED BY THREATS OF MINIMUM 
MANDATORY PUNISHMENT. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS 
GUILTY PLEA. 
A. A GUILTY PLEA MAY BE WITHDRAWN IF ENTERED AS A RESULT OF 
FRAUD, DURESS, MISTAKE, OR IGNORANCE. 
It is a well-established principle of law in Utah as well as 
the rest of the country that withdrawal of a guilty plea lies 
within the sound discretion of the trial court and that a 
Defendant may not withdraw his guilty plea as a matter of right. 
State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450 (Utah 1978) and State v. Hanson, 
627 P.2d 53 (Utah 1981). However, it is equally well-established 
that a guilty plea which is entered as a result of fraud, duress, 
mistake, or ignorance, should be allowed to be withdrawn. 
"The court has an undoubted duty to guard against the 
possiblity that an accused who is innocent of the crime 
charged may be induced to plead guilty without sufficient 
understanding of the nature of the charge or the 
consequences of his plea....11 State v. Harris, 585 P. 2d at 
452. 
In the case of State v. Corvelo, 369 P.2d 903, 91 Ariz. 52 
(Ariz. 1962), the Arizona court held that a defendant should be 
allowed to withdraw a guilty plea where it appeared the plea was 
made under some mistake or misapprehension. In the case of State 
v. Riley, 539 P.2d 526, 24 Ariz.App. 412 (Ariz. 1975), a 
defendant entered a plea of guilty not realizing that the charge 
carried minimum mandatory provisions. In that case the defendant 
had been advised by the Court and counsel that there were no 
minimum mandatory provisions for the crime to which he was 
pleading guilty. The Arizona court held that the trial court 
should have allowed withdrawal of the plea since it was not 
entered knowingly. See also Hutton v. People, 398 P.2d 973 (Colo. 
1965); Maes v. People, 396 P.2d 457 (Colo. 1964); State v. Byrd, 
453 P.2d 22, 203 Kan. 45 (Kan. 1969); and Manning v. State, 374 
P.2d 796 (Okla.Cr. 1962). 
In the case of State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 
1983), the defendant plead guilty and recited to the Court the 
facts upon which his plea was based. That recitation of facts 
indicated that defendant did not possess the mental element of 
the crime of arson. This Court held that the plea should have 
been withdrawn because the defendant misunderstood the elements 
of the crime. 
B. DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS ENTERED UNDER A MISUNDERSTANDING OF 
THE LAW. 
The record clearly indicates that Defendant was originally 
charged with having committed a First Degree Felony. Under Utah 
law, First Degree Felonies carry prison terms of not less than 
five years and which may be for life. Other than cases involving 
capital punishment and life sentences for homicide, a sentence of 
five years to life is the most serious punishment one can receive 
in Utah. Alternatively, a Second Degree Felony in Utah carries a 
prison term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years. In terms of maximum punishments, a First Degree Felony is 
roughly five times worse than a Second Degree Felony. At the time 
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this Defendant appeared for arraignment, all participants 
believed that Defendant's alternatives were to stand trial for 
the First Degree Felony or plead guilty to the significantly 
milder Second Degree Felony. Believing those to be his only 
alternatives, Defendant chose to avoid the risk of possible 
lifetime incarceration and chose to give up his constitutional 
right to a jury by his peers by pleading guilty to the Second 
Degree Felony. 
The record is also clear that prior to entry of Defendant's 
plea in this case, the legislature amended the statute under 
which Defendant was originally charged to designate it a Second 
Degree Felony. If Defendant had been charged according to the way 
the law actually stood at the time of his arraignment, his 
choices would have been to plead to the Second Degree Felony or 
to stand trial on the Second Degree Felony. Faced with those 
alternatives, Defendant would have obviously opted to exercise 
his constitutional rights. 
In this case the Defendant decided to forego his right to 
jury trial and plead guilty to the lesser charge because he 
believed the alternative was possible lifetime incarceration. The 
County Attorney's response to Defendant's Motion to Withdraw his 
plea indicates that none of the attorneys nor the Court were 
aware the legislature had amended the statute under which this 
Defendant was charged. It further indicated that at the time 
Defendant was initially sentenced, everyone was aware the law had 
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been changed. It is clear that the Defendant should have been 
allowed to withdraw his plea. 
In the case of Trenary v. State, 453 So.2d 1132 (Fla.App.D2 
1984) a defendant entered a guilty plea in reliance upon his 
attorney's advice. The attorney's advice was based upon an honest 
mistake or misunderstanding as to what the law provided and the 
Court held the defendant should have been allowed to withdraw his 
plea. 
In the case of Britt v. State, 352 So.2d 148 (Fla.App.D2 
1977), the Florida Court stated as follows: 
"Appellant argues the trial judge should have granted his 
motion to set aside his pleas because he did not enter into 
those pleas volutarily because both his own court-appointed 
counsel and the court led him to believe the maximum 
sentence was fifteen rather than five years. 
It is clear from the facts of this case that there was 
a general misapprehension among all the parties involved as 
to the length of the time which appellant could be 
imprisoned. Even the trial court believed that appellant 
could receive a fifteen year sentence when, in fact, under 
Sections 810.05 and 775.002(5), Florida Statutes (1973), 
appellant could only receive a five-year sentence. 
A person induced to give up his right to a trial by a 
misapprehension of circumstances surrounding his plea is 
entitled to vacation of any judgment and sentence resulting 
from such a plea." 352 So.2d at 149. 
In the later case of Forbert v. State, 437 So.2d 1079 (Fla. 
1983), a defendant had entered a plea of guilty with the 
understanding that the sentence entered, five years in prison 
followed by three years on probation, was a legal sentence. This 
type of split sentence was later determined by the Florida 
Supreme Court to be illegal and the trial court resentenced the 
defendant to eight years in prison. That court stated: 
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"Hence when a defendant pleads guilty with the understanding 
that the sentence he or she receives in exchange is legal, 
when in fact the sentence is not legal, the defendant should 
be given the opportunity to withdraw the plea when later 
challenging the legality of the sentence." 437 So.2d at 
1081. 
The case before the Court appears to be very similar to the 
cases recently decided in Florida. This Defendant entered a plea 
of guilty to a Second Degree Felony rather than risking 
conviction on a First Degree Felony. At the time the plea was 
entered, the original charge had been amended by the legislature 
and was now only a Second Degree Felony itself. Defendant gave up 
his constitutional rights in order to avoid the risk of possible 
lifetime incarceration, when that possibility did not, in fact, 
exist. Defendant's plea was entered under a complete 
misunderstanding or misapprehension regarding his alternatives 
and the trial court erred in denying Defendant's Motion to 
Withdraw his Guilty Plea. 
C. DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS INDUCED BY THREATS OF MINIMUM 
MANDATORY PUNISHMENT. 
In this matter, the Defendant has repeatedly asserted that 
his guilty plea was induced through the prosecution's threats of 
minimum mandatory sentencing. The crime with which Defendant was 
originally charged did not contain provision for minimum 
mandatory sentencing. There was provision, however, that under 
certain aggravating circumstances, the Court could impose minimum 
mandatory sentences. 
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In the County Attorney's response to Defendant's Motion to 
Withdraw his Plea, the prosecutor admitted that "plea 
negotiations did involve discussions of minimum mandatory 
sentencing." The County Attorney's office denied that there had 
been anything improper with those discussions because the office 
deemed those punishments to be available at the time. Whether 
those punishments were available at the time, Defendant has 
asserted that he was under the impression that if he did not 
plead guilty to the Second Degree Felony, the prosecutor intended 
to seek minimum mandatory sentencing. 
Whether the prosecutor's use of minimum mandatory sentencing 
was a threat or improper inducement, the fact remains that there 
had been discussion of minimum mandatory sentencing and 
subsequently, Defendant chose to plead guilty to a crime which 
avoided minimum mandatory sentencing. At this point the Court 
could safely assume that the possibility of minimum mandatory 
sentencing, if Defendant did not accept the offered plea bargain, 
was part of Defendant's inducement to enter a plea. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant in this case entered a plea of guilty to a 
Second Degree Felony, believing that the alternative was a First 
Degree Felony with its possible lifetime incarceration. Defendant 
further believed that the prosecutor intended to seek minimum 
mandatory sentencing if a guilty plea was not entered on the 
Second Degree Felony. The Defendant' plea was entered under a 
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misunderstanding regarding the law which was in effect at the 
time of the plea and under threat of minimum mandatory sentencing 
if a plea of guilty was not entered. Under either theory, the 
Defendant should have been allowed to withdraw his plea. The 
Courtfs denial of Defendant's Motion was an abuse of discretion 
and the matter should be remanded to the District Court with 
instructions to allow Defendant to withdraw his plea and proceed 
to trial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted this ^Qfa day of February, 1986. 
KENT 0. WILLIS 
Attorney for Defendant 
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